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The Digital Economy Act 2010: Subscriber Monitoring and the Right to 
Privacy under Article 8 of the ECHR 
 
Abstract 
This paper critically assesses the compatibility of s3 Digital Economy Act 2010 
(DEA) with Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (1950) 
(ECHR). The analysis draws on Ofcom’s Initial Obligations and two UK cases, 
namely: British Telecommunications Plc & Anor, R (on the application of) v The 
Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills,2 and R (British 
Telecommunications plc and TalkTalk Telecom Group plc) v Secretary of State 
for Culture, Olympics, Media and Sport and others.3 It argues that the 
implementation of this obligation allows directed surveillance of subscribers’ 
activities without legal authorization under the Regulation of Investigatory 
Powers Act 2000 (RIPA).4 It also analyses compliance with the Strasbourg 
Court’s three-part, non-cumulative test, to determine whether s3 of the DEA: is 
firstly, ‘in accordance with the law;’ secondly, pursues one or more legitimate 
aims contained within Article 8(2) of the Convention; and thirdly, is ‘necessary’ 
and ‘proportionate.’ It concludes that unless the implementation of s3 of the DEA 
required the involvement of State authorities and was specifically targeted at 
serious, commercial scale online copyright infringement cases it could infringe 
part one and part three of the ECtHR’s test, thereby violating subscribers’ Article 
8 ECHR rights. 
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Introduction 
In June 2012, Ofcom published the Revised Draft Initial Obligations Code 
(hereafter ‘the Ofcom Code’), outlining how the Digital Economy Act 2010 
(DEA) would work. If any revisions to the Ofcom Code were to be made, Ofcom 
would, subject to the Secretary of State approval, produce the final Initial 
Obligations Code. This Code would then be laid in Parliament.5 The DEA 
imposes, in s 3, an obligation on Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to notify 
subscribers of their alleged unlawful file-sharing based on evidence of online 
copyright infringement gathered by investigatory agents’ monitoring software 
and recorded in Copyright Infringement Reports (CIRs). In order to perform 
subscriber monitoring, investigatory agents such as MarkMonitor use DtecNet 
software to monitor peer-to-peer file-sharing networks.6 Arguably these 
copyright infringement detection measures amount to digital surveillance of file 
sharing activities and an invasion of internet users’ privacy, so the goal of this 
paper is to review the legality of such actions. 
 
The efficacy of MarkMonitor’s copyright infringement detection system has so 
far been assessed on two occasions. The first review was conducted in November 
2012 by the digital risk management firm Stroz Friedberg.7 In March 2014, 
Harbor Labs (an internet litigation consulting firm) carried out a follow-up 
review.8 It confirmed Stroz’s findings that in order to detect illegal copies, 
MarkMonitor employees search online for possibly infringing files. Detected 
material is then reviewed manually or using automatic content recognition 
software9 to establish if it is an existing illegal copy of the copyrighted work.10 
Concurrently, MarkMonitor’s DtecNet software (the gathering tool) searches for, 
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downloads samples of, and creates evidence of shared copyrighted material.11 
CIRs are subsequently generated and sent to the relevant ISP who then has to 
identify and notify the subscriber that they have infringed copyright on the 
internet.12 In this paper, I will argue that these anti-copyright infringement 
measures constitute covert surveillance of subscriber activities and an unjustified 
invasion of their privacy.  
 
The Revised Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) Code of 
Practice provides guidance on the use by State authorities of Part II of the RIPA.13 
The Revised RIPA Code (hereafter ‘the RIPA Code’) is admissible as evidence 
in both civil and criminal proceedings.14 The RIPA Code asserts that an individual 
might have a diminished expectation of privacy when in a public space, for 
instance in a public file-sharing network. However, it also explains that where 
personal data is collected via covert surveillance of that individual’s activities, 
such an individual still has a reasonable expectation of privacy, and authorisation 
for directed surveillance is needed.15 Section 26(2) of the RIPA 2000 states that 
directed surveillance is covert surveillance which is performed for a specific 
investigation; it is expected to lead to the obtaining of private data about an 
individual and it is ‘carried out’ rather than via an immediate response to 
circumstances or events.16 Arguably, DtecNet monitoring software is employed 
for specific infringement detection since it is expected to lead to the obtaining of 
the subscriber uploader’s IP addresses, and it is not an immediate response to 
online copyright infringement.  
 
In the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) decision of Productores de 
Musica de Espana (Promusicae) v Telefonica de Espana SAU, the Advocate 
General (AG) made explicit reference to the CJEU joined cases of European 
Parliament v Council of the European Union.17 The AG noted that pursuant to 
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the latter ruling, State authorities could compel private persons to assist them in 
tackling online copyright infringement. However, Kokott highlighted that 
independent action by rightholders against infringement, was allowed for State 
security and the activities of the State in areas of criminal law.18 Therefore, the 
issue here concerns the State’s obligation under Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) to abstain from interfering with 
subscribers’ right to private life and correspondence.19 In R (British 
Telecommunications plc and TalkTalk Telecom Group plc) v Secretary of State 
for Culture, Olympics, Media and Sport and others, the Court of Appeal agreed 
with Parker J that the data processed by rightholders not only constituted personal 
data (subscriber uploader’s IP addresses), but also sensitive personal data 
(information about consumption habits e.g., the downloading of copyrighted 
political or religious material) as understood in the Data Protection Act 1998.20 
Further, as demonstrated in the case of Copland v the United Kingdom, the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) observed that data obtained from 
personal internet usage monitoring was protected under Article 8 of the ECHR.21 
It found that the gathering of personal data concerning the claimant’s internet 
usage, without her permission, amounted to interference with her Article 8 ECHR 
rights.22  
Thus, Section 3 of the DEA clearly interferes with Article 8. This interference 
will violate Article 8 of the Convention unless it is ‘in accordance with the law’’ 
pursues one or more legitimate aims contained within Article 8(2); and it is 
‘necessary’ and ‘proportionate’ to achieve these aims.23 As Cameron notes, these 
three prongs of the ECtHR’s test are non-cumulative, so that a failure to satisfy 
one prong constitutes a breach of Article 8 irrespective of conformity with the 
other prongs.24 This paper examines part one, part two and part three of the 
ECtHR’s test, in an effort to determine whether the steps taken to generate CIRs, 
which amounts to surveillance and an unwarranted invasion of privacy, could 
infringe subscribers’ Article 8 right to privacy, under the Convention. I conclude 
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that unless the implementation of Section 3 of the DEA required the involvement 
of State authorities, e.g., the courts or the data protection supervisory authorities, 
(the Information Commissioner’s Office - ICO) and was specifically targeted to 
serious online copyright infringement cases of ‘commercial scale’,25 it could 
infringe part one and part three of the ECtHR’s test, thus violating subscribers’ 
Article 8 ECHR rights. 
 
Covert surveillance of subscribers could be incompatible with the right to 
privacy under the first-part of the ECtHR’s non-cumulative test  
The Strasbourg Court’s case-law has confirmed that for any interference with the 
right to privacy to be ‘in accordance with the law’ under Article 8 of the 
Convention three requirements must be met: firstly, it has to be based in domestic 
legislation; secondly, such legislation should also be accessible; and thirdly, it 
needs to comply with the ECtHR foreseeability and rule of law principles.26 The 
basis in domestic legislation requirement is unproblematic since Section 3 of the 
DEA (written law), and British Telecommunications Plc & Anor, R (on the 
application of) v The Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills27 
(case-law), provide a legitimate basis for interfering. The second requirement 
does not pose any problem either, as the DEA is available online. However, 
regarding the third requirement, this section will argue that it fails to comply with 
the ECtHR’s foreseeability and rule of law principles. It will demonstrate this by 
referring to the Ofcom Code and British Telecommunications Plc & Anor, R (on 
the application of) v The Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills28.  
 
There is no mention in the Ofcom Code, that investigatory agents such as 
MarkMonitor use DtecNet’s monitoring software to gather evidence of alleged 
illegal file-sharing, record it in CIRs and request that the ISP identify and notify 
the subscriber that they have committed an infringement. The Explanatory Notes 
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of the DEA state that rightholders can go online to seek content to which they 
have the copyright, and accordingly, rightholders can download a copy of that 
content and in doing so obtain the subscriber uploader’s IP address in conjunction 
with date and time stamp identification. Nevertheless, the Explanatory Notes 
indicate that the rightholder is unable to link this information to data about the 
subscriber to whom the IP address was assigned as such data is held by ISPs.29 
Thus, under Section 3 of the DEA, the ISP is required to identify and notify the 
subscriber if it receives a CIR from a rightholder linked to their IP address.30  
 
The Ofcom Code states that reliable evidence-gathering techniques are crucial.31 
It remarks that in the case of Media CAT Ltd v Adams and others,32 in twenty-
seven cases brought before Birss J, the Patents County Court was very critical of 
the unwillingness of ACS:Law to subject its evidence and information-gathering 
methods to ‘judicial scrutiny’.33 In this context, two points are worth 
remembering: firstly, a rightholder can only send a CIR if it has collected 
information which provides reasonable grounds to believe that either a subscriber 
contravened copyright via the internet or that he allowed another individual to do 
so;34 and secondly, rightholders must submit their information-gathering methods 
for authorization to Ofcom before sending their first CIR.35 Moreover, in order to 
review and authorise these methods, Ofcom proposes to sponsor the creation of 
an evidence gathering technical standard through an independent standard-setting 
body.36 
 
It should be noted that Birss J’s views in Media CAT Ltd v Adams and others37 
above, are similar to those of Lord Young: 
‘My Lords, Clause 4 sets out the requirements that must be met to produce a 
copyright infringement report. These reports are the mechanism by which the 
copyright owner brings specific apparent infringements of their copyright via a 
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particular IP address-and I stress ‘apparent’-at a particular point in time to the 
attention of the relevant internet service provider. Some of these amendments 
seek to change the name of these reports from copyright infringement reports to 
copyright infringement allegation reports. Others propose a change of the 
wording to require the trigger leading to the creation of a CIR to be that in the 
‘reasonable opinion’ of the copyright holder an infringement of their rights has 
occurred on that internet account, rather than it merely ‘appearing to them’ that 
an infringement has occurred. I recognise that the apparent infringements are not 
tested and proved to court standards. It will not be possible at the time the 
copyright infringement report is made to be able to declare with legal certainty 
that an infringement has occurred or that the IP address in the reports was 
responsible. Given this, clearly it is of the utmost importance that the standards 
of evidence surrounding the identification of both the infringement and the IP 
address of the infringing account should be as high as possible. I certainly concur 
with the points that the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, made in relation to the 
standard of evidence and not presuming this is an open-and-shut case; and indeed 
with the point that the noble Lord, Lord De Mauley, made about speculative 
allegations-in other words, what is important is the standard of proof and 
evidence. New subsection (3) in Clause 4 already expressly recognises that the 
infringement described in a copyright infringement report is, as the noble Lord, 
Lord De Mauley, reminds us, only ‘apparent’. Equally I think that the copyright 
infringement reports amount to more than mere allegation’.38 
  
The Ofcom Code also explains that in producing CIRs and notifications, 
rightholders and ISPs remain subject to all present legal duties, including but not 
restricted to the RIPA 2000.39 It highlights that some stakeholders have proposed 
that Ofcom should ask the ICO to make guidance available concerning data 
protection issues and that Ofcom should consult the Home Office concerning the 
interplay between the Ofcom Code and the RIPA.40 Moreover, the Ofcom Draft 
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Costs Order notes that one ISP recommended that the systems for IP address 
recording and matching, created to serve the DEA obligations be employed in 
servicing the ISP’s obligations in response to RIPA requests.41 However, 
importantly, Ofcom understands that RIPA requests might involve a different set 
of regulations regarding security, timeliness, and data analysis.42 Thus, it is rather 
worrying that Ofcom considers that the adoption of shared systems for RIPA 
requests and for DEA obligations, would be inefficient for the fulfilment of 
Section 3 of the DEA.43 Arguably, this is especially true when the DEA allows 
investigatory agents to perform directed surveillance of subscriber activities, 
without being legally authorized to do so under RIPA.  
 
Interestingly, the monitoring of subscribers by rightholders was explicitly 
addressed in British Telecommunications Plc & Anor, R (on the application of) v 
The Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills. Parker J noted that 
pursuant to Article 15(1) of E-Commerce Directive 2000/31/EC, nothing in the 
DEA compelled ISPs to seek facts or circumstances, denoting unlawful activity.44 
He explained that it was the rightholder who must seek these facts or 
circumstances and send CIRs to the ISP. He highlighted that the only task of the 
ISP was to identify the alleged copyright infringer. He found that: ‘if a police 
officer observes a motor car passing through a red light, and asks an official at 
the vehicle licensing authority to disclose the name and address of the registered 
keeper (and presumed driver) of the car, that official, in responding, would not 
actively be seeking facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity. She would 
be doing no more than identifying, in response to a specific request, the person 
who, according to the investigation already completed by the police officer, had 
infringed the traffic code’.45 However, it is regrettable that the Court appears to 
have omitted relevant legal information, in particular Article 8 of the ECHR. 
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Lagerwall argues that compliance with the Strasbourg Court principle of 
foreseeability relates to the question of ‘when’ State authorities might use secret 
surveillance measures.46 He explains that this involves an assessment of the 
circumstances where such measures might be carried out and against whom they 
can apply. Moreover, Lagerwall claims that compliance with the ECtHR principle 
of the rule of law refers to questions such as, ‘what’ discretion is given to State 
authorities, ‘how’ measures are conducted and ‘who’ is empowered with 
competence.47 He states that this entails reviewing how State authorities’ powers 
are employed and which control mechanisms are employed instead of focusing 
on the conditions under which they are used.48 It will now be considered how the 
Ofcom Code could fail to comply with the ECtHR’s foreseeability and rule of 
law principles, thus infringing the first-part of the Court’s non-cumulative test 
(i.e., the ‘in accordance with the law’ test) under Article 8(2) of the ECHR.  
 
In applying the principle of foreseeability in the judgement of Malone v the 
United Kingdom, the Strasbourg Court observed that under Article 8(2) of the 
Convention, the law had to be sufficiently clear in its terms to afford individuals 
an adequate indication of the circumstances where and the conditions upon which 
State authorities were permitted to use secret surveillance measures.49 As noted 
above, the Explanatory Notes indicate that rightholders can go online and detect 
illegal copying of copyright protected content.50 However, it can be contended 
that neither Section 3 of the DEA nor the Ofcom Code, specifies the 
circumstances in which the use of MarkMonitor’s DtecNet software can be used. 
One could adopt an analogous view, as Parker J did in British 
Telecommunications Plc & Anor, R (on the application of) v The Secretary of 
State for Business, Innovation and Skills that investigatory agents are like ‘police 
officers’ who ask officials (ISPs) to reveal the name and addresses of infringing 
drivers (alleged copyright infringers).51 Although omitted from the Ofcom Code, 
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it is worth stressing however, that according to Section 28 of the RIPA, in order 
to engage in monitoring, these ‘police officers’ need to be granted authorisation.52 
The RIPA Code states that if the investigation is considered ‘necessary’ on one 
of more of the statutory grounds, the individual granting authorization for 
directed surveillance must conclude that it is ‘proportionate’ to the aim pursued.53 
This entails balancing the gravity of the privacy invasion concerning the subject 
of the investigation (e.g., subscribers) or any other individual who might be 
impacted (e.g., ‘all’ users) against the necessity of investigating.54 Notably, the 
fact that an alleged offence might be grave is insufficient to render subscriber 
monitoring proportionate.55 Thus, as Section 3 does not specify the circumstances 
where monitoring software measures may be ordered, as required by Section 28 
of the RIPA, it arguably fails to satisfy the ECtHR foreseeability principle under 
Article 8(2) ECHR.  
 
Again, in applying the principle of foreseeability in the ruling of Liberty and 
others v the United Kingdom the ECtHR noted that in order to avoid abuse of 
power under Article 8(2) of the Convention, a minimum safeguard that should be 
laid down by statute, was a definition of the types of individuals with respect to 
whom the use of surveillance measures may be ordered.56 As outlined above, the 
Ofcom Code asserts that rightholders can only send CIRs if they have collected 
information which provides reasonable grounds to believe that a subscriber 
infringed copyright, or that he allowed another individual to do so.57 
Problematically, however, the Ofcom Code fails to address, much less recognize, 
the types of subscribers against whom the use of MarkMonitor’s DtecNet 
software can be ordered. Section 28(3) of the RIPA states that authorisation for 
directed surveillance may only be granted if the authorising officer believes that 
it is necessary, inter alia, (g) for any purpose (falling outside paragraphs (a) to 
(f)) that is specified by an order made by the Secretary of State.58 The use of 
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directed surveillance of subscribers’ activities would be permitted under Section 
28(3)(g) RIPA. The Revised RIPA Code explains that Section 28(3)(g) allows 
directed surveillance authorization to be granted, pursuant to the Secretary of 
State order, which complies with the criteria set out in Article 8(2) ECHR – e.g., 
for the protection of the rights of others.59 However, even if this were the case, 
Section 3 of the DEA does not specify the types of subscribers against whom the 
use of monitoring software measures may be ordered. Therefore, it might be 
objected that it fails to comply with the ECtHR principle of foreseeability under 
Article 8(2) ECHR.  
 
With regard to the rule of law principle, in Rotaru v Romania, the Strasbourg 
Court found that for secret surveillance measures to be compliant with Article 8 
of the Convention they must include safeguards laid down by statute that apply 
to the oversight of State authorities’ activities.60 As mentioned above, in order to 
review and authorise the rightholders’ information gathering methods, Ofcom 
proposes to sponsor the creation of an evidence gathering technical standard, 
through an independent standard-setting body.61 However, it is regrettable that 
neither Section 3 nor the Ofcom Code requires that the development of this 
standard be subject to state authority supervision, i.e., the courts or the ICO. In 
the CJEU decision of Productores de Musica de Espana (Promusicae) v 
Telefonica de Espana SAU, the AG stressed that involving State authorities was 
appropriate as, unlike private persons, they are required to observe procedural 
safeguards, thereby preventing human rights abuses.62 The European Data 
Protection Supervisor (EDPS) considers that the above data processing 
operations could eventually lead to criminal prosecution thereby posing specific 
risks to individual rights. Thus, he explains that ‘national data protection 
authorities’ should check and authorise these evidence-gathering methods before 
CIRs are issued.63 He notes that the fact that this processing entails the monitoring 
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of internet communications is another factor requiring stronger supervision.64 
Stroz Friedberg’s review found that MarkMonitor evidence is ‘robust, defensible, 
and will stand… evidentiary challenges’.65 However, as TorrentFreak reported in 
February 2013, DtecNet not only wrongly identified legitimate content from the 
pay television service company HBO as infringing and asked Google to censor 
links to HBO.com, but also some sought censorship of lawful websites that wrote 
reviews about HBO material.66 Consequently, it is concerning that under the 
RIPA, the Investigatory Powers Tribunal cannot handle complaints against the 
use of private sector monitoring (MarkMonitor). Thus, since Section 3 DEA 2010 
does not require that the evidence gathering technical standard be previously 
checked and authorised by the ICO, it is debatable whether it fails to satisfy the 
ECtHR rule of law principle under Article 8(2) ECHR.  
 
Covert surveillance of subscribers could be incompatible with the right to 
privacy under the second-part of the ECtHR’s non-cumulative test  
Article 8(2) of the Convention outlines that State authorities can interfere with 
the right to privacy to protect, inter alia, one or more of the following (legitimate) 
aims: firstly, domestic security, public safety or the economic well-being of the 
country; secondly, the prevention of disorder or crime; and lastly, the protection 
of the rights and freedoms of others.67 This list is exhaustive; thus, interference is 
only allowed on the above grounds.68  Cameron argues that since it is relatively 
easy for states to satisfy the legitimate aim prong, the second-part of the ECtHR’s 
non-cumulative test is a mere formality.69 With that in mind, this section will 
argue that Section 3 of the DEA can enable pursuance of one or more of the 
legitimate aims contained in Article 8(2) of the Convention in compliance with 
the second-part of the Strasbourg Court’s non-cumulative test. It will demonstrate 
this by referring to the CJEU case of Productores de Musica de Espana 
(Promusicae) v Telefonica de Espana SAU70 and R (British Telecommunications 
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plc and TalkTalk Telecom Group plc) v Secretary of State for Culture, Olympics, 
Media and Sport and others 71. 
 
To begin with, the UK government states that Article 8 is a qualified right, so it 
is legitimate under the ECHR to restrict such a right, if the restriction is in the 
public interest and in accordance with the law.72 Specifically, the government 
explains that the DEA strikes a fair balance between subscriber rights and 
rightholder rights, as the qualification to Article 8 must take into account the 
rights of others.73 However, when considering the compatibility of Section 3 of 
the DEA with the second-part of the ECtHR’s non-cumulative test, it is important 
to note that the government makes explicit reference to the CJEU decision of 
Productores de Musica de Espana (Promusicae) v Telefonica de Espana SAU.74 
It emphasizes that this case not only acknowledges that effective copyright 
protection constitutes a legitimate aim, but also offers guidance on the steps to be 
taken to strike an appropriate balance between the various rights at stake.75 
 
In the case of Productores de Musica de Espana (Promusicae) v Telefonica de 
Espana SAU, the CJEU observed that Article 15(1) of E-Privacy Directive 
2002/58/EC provided member states with the opportunity to allow exceptions to 
the duty to ensure the confidentiality of IP address’ traffic data76 – (e.g., 
subscriber uploader’s IP addresses). It explained that the exceptions in Article 
15(1) include: firstly, public security, defence and national security, which 
constituted ‘activities of the State or of State authorities’; and secondly, the 
enforcement of criminal law.77 However, in assessing the compatibility of Section 
3 with Article 8(2) of the Convention, the key thing to remember is the CJEU’s 
next finding. The CJEU highlighted that Article 15(1) concluded the list of the 
above exceptions by making explicit reference to Article 13(1) of Data Protection 
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Directive 95/46/EC. It found that the latter provision also allowed member states 
to adopt legislative measures to derogate from the duty of confidentiality of IP 
address’ traffic, where such restriction was required to protect the rights and 
freedoms of others.78   
 
The CJEU’s finding above differs significantly from the AG’s opinion in the 
same decision. The AG explained that rightholders must be provided with an 
opportunity to defend themselves against charges of online copyright 
infringement.79 Kokott also stated that this case Productores de Musica de 
Espana (Promusicae) v Telefonica de Espana SAU, was not concerned with 
whether access to the courts was possible, but with the techniques used for 
detection of online copyright infringement, being made available to 
rightholders.80 Crucially, in agreement with the Working Party81 and the EDPS,82 
Kokott warned that ‘the State’s duties of protection are not so far-reaching that 
unlimited means should be made available to the rightholder for the purpose of 
detecting infringements of rights. Rather, it is not objectionable for certain rights 
of detection to remain reserved for States authorities or not to be available at 
all.’83 
 
It should be noted that the task of the AG is to deliver independent and impartial 
expert opinions on decisions, which, as above, give rise to new legal issues before 
the CJEU. Although the AG’s opinion is advisory and not legally binding on the 
CJEU, it is very significant and the CJEU tends to follow its recommendations. 
Unlike the CJEU’s ruling, the AG’s opinion normally addresses all possible legal 
solutions and questions of law, which may be particularly relevant to a decision84 
such as, the legitimacy of private surveillance by investigatory agents for the 
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purposes of online copyright enforcement. The impact of the AG’s opinion must 
be interpreted over a period of time. For example, in NV Algemene Transport en 
Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue 
Administration,85 the CJEU was asked to decide whether the principle of direct 
effect should be incorporated into EU law. After considering the AG’s opinion, 
the CJEU recognized this principle as part of Community law, meaning that 
individuals were effectively able to enforce EU law rights against the State.86  
 
Interestingly, in R (British Telecommunications plc and TalkTalk Telecom Group 
plc) v Secretary of State for Culture, Olympics, Media and Sport and others, the 
Court of Appeal observed that Parker J, at first instance, rejected the ISPs’ claim 
that the CJEU case of Productores de Musica de Espana (Promusicae) v 
Telefonica de Espana SAU87 only related to the protection of property in civil 
proceedings where there was judicial supervision, and that no broader derogation 
was to be read into Article 15(1) of E-Privacy Directive 2002/58/EC in order to 
apply in the present context.88 However, the Court found that, in doing so, Parker 
J arrived at a judicious decision.89 It concluded that it was clear from the 
judgement of Productores de Musica de Espana (Promusicae) v Telefonica de 
Espana SAU90 that Article 15(1) of E-Privacy Directive 2002/58/EC also covered 
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, including intellectual property, 
and therefore copyright. This was not restricted to the context of civil 
proceedings.91  
 
Article 8(2) of the Convention confirms that State authorities can interfere with 
the right to privacy in order to protect national security, public safety or the 
economic well-being of the country.92 This legitimate aim was accepted in the 
Strasbourg Court decision of Uzun v Germany.93 As discussed earlier, under 
Section 28(3) of the RIPA, authorisation for directed surveillance may be granted 
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(a) in the interest of domestic security; (c) the economic well-being of the UK; 
and (d) public safety.94 In the case of Productores de Musica de Espana 
(Promusicae) v Telefonica de Espana SAU the CJEU observed that, under Article 
15(1) of E-Privacy Directive 2002/58/EC, member states might implement legal 
measures to limit the scope of the duty to ensure the confidentiality of subscriber 
uploader’s IP addresses, if such measures were appropriate, necessary and 
proportionate to protect State security as stated in Article 13(1) of Data Protection 
Directive 95/46/EC. However, the CJEU correctly highlighted that this 
constituted ‘activities of the State or of State authorities’.95 Moreover, in this 
decision, the AG also noted that the domestic security and public policy exception 
could just be raised if a sufficiently grave and genuine threat existed, affecting 
one of the fundamental interests of society, such as the protection of copyright.96 
Resultantly, although rightholders’ interests were mainly private, not public, 
Kokott suggested that unlawful file-sharing genuinely threatened copyright 
protection.97 However, importantly, she stressed that it was unclear that private 
file-sharing, especially if it occurred ‘without any intention to make a profit’, 
threatened copyright protection sufficiently seriously to justify this exception.98 
Thus, as Section 3 of the DEA can justify recourse to the domestic security, public 
safety or the economic well-being of UK exception, it is arguable that it may 
constitute a legitimate aim under Article 8(2) ECHR. However, it would require 
the involvement of State authorities, such as, the courts or the domestic data 
protection supervisory authorities, (e.g., the ICO).  
 
Article 8(2) of the ECHR elaborates that State authorities can interfere with the 
right to privacy for the prevention of disorder or crime.99 This legitimate aim was 
discussed in the ECtHR decision of Klass and others v Germany.100 Equally, as 
noted earlier, Section 28(3)(b) RIPA states that authorisation for directed 
surveillance may be granted to prevent or detect crime or to prevent disorder.101 
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As stated above, in the case of Productores de Musica de Espana (Promusicae) 
v Telefonica de Espana SAU, the CJEU observed that Article 15(1) of E-Privacy 
Directive 2002/58/EC gave member states the opportunity to allow exceptions to 
the duty to ensure the confidentiality of subscriber uploader’s IP addresses when 
these measures were appropriate, necessary and proportionate in criminal 
prosecution cases, as stated in Article 13(1) of Data Protection Directive 
95/46/EC.102 Here too, the AG acknowledged that whilst under Article 15(1) 
member states might allow IP address traffic data to be transmitted to State 
authorities to initiate civil and criminal proceedings against illegal file-sharing, 
they were not compelled to do so.103 Kokott pointed out that criminal liability was 
not precluded, as was evident from Article 16 of the Intellectual Property Rights 
Enforcement Directive 2004/48/EC and Article 8(1) of the Copyright Directive 
2001/29/EC; domestic law must decide whether and in what form contraventions 
of copyright were punished.104 However, notably, she stated that involving State 
authorities was appropriate since, unlike private persons, they must reinforce 
procedural safeguards, thereby preventing violations of human rights.105 
Importantly, she concluded that unlike State authorities, rightholders had no 
interest in taking into account circumstances that exonerate the subscriber 
accused of online copyright infringement.106 Thus, since Section 3 of the DEA 
can justify recourse to the prevention of disorder or crime exception, it could 
potentially constitute a legitimate aim under Article 8(2) ECHR. However, this 
would require online copyright infringement via file-sharing to become a criminal 
offence and the intervention of State authorities to be implemented. 
  
Article 8(2) of the ECHR adds that State authorities can interfere with the right 
to privacy for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.107 This 
legitimate aim was accepted in the ECtHR decision of Copland v the United 
Kingdom.108 RIPA does not expressly covers the rights of others exception. It is 
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worth noting, however, that Section 28(3)(g) RIPA would do so. As noted before, 
the RIPA Code states that under this provision directed surveillance authorization 
might be granted, pursuant to an order by the Secretary of State that complies 
with the criteria set out in Article 8(2) ECHR.109 In the case of Productores de 
Musica de Espana (Promusicae) v Telefonica de Espana SAU, the CJEU pointed 
out that Article 15(1) of E-Privacy Directive 2002/58/EC concluded the list of 
exceptions by making explicit reference to Article 13(1) of Data Protection 
Directive 95/46/EC. The Court explained that this latter provision also permitted 
member states to implement legal measures to derogate from the duty of 
confidentiality of subscriber uploader’s IP addresses if such derogation was 
necessary to protect the rights and freedoms of others. The CJEU found that, as 
they failed to indicate the rights and freedoms involved, the requirements of 
Article 15(1), had to be understood as reflecting the EU legislative’s intent not to 
preclude from their scope intellectual property protection or situations where 
creators sought to acquire such protection in civil cases.110 Therefore, as Section 
3 of the DEA can justify recourse to rights and freedoms of others exception, it is 
clear that it may constitute a legitimate aim, under Article 8(2) of the ECHR.  
Covert surveillance of subscribers could be incompatible with the right to 
privacy under the third-part of the ECtHR’s non-cumulative test  
The last issue to be examined in this paper, is whether Section 3 of the DEA 
complies with the third-part of the Strasbourg Court’s non-cumulative test. The 
ECtHR’s case-law has confirmed that under Article 8(2) of the Convention, 
measures of secret surveillance are ‘necessary in a democratic society’, if they 
respond to a ‘pressing social need’ and are proportionate to the legitimate aim 
pursued.111 Moreover, the Court has noted that the reasons given by the state to 
justify them, must be ‘relevant and sufficient’.112 Yet whilst State authorities 
enjoy a certain margin of appreciation, the final assessment as to the necessity 
and proportionality of these measures remains subject to review by the Court.113 
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In this section, it will be argued that the use of monitoring software measures fails 
to satisfy the necessity and proportionality principles. This will be demonstrated 
by considering the Ofcom Code and R (British Telecommunications plc and 
TalkTalk Telecom Group plc) v Secretary of State for Culture, Olympics, Media 
and Sport and others114. 
 
The Ofcom Code states that Section 3 of the DEA compels an ISP that receives a 
CIR to identify the subscriber to which the CIR is related and issue notifications. 
Accordingly, to ensure that the procedure of linking IP addresses to subscribers 
is robust and accurate, the Ofcom Code notes that ISPs should, before sending 
their first warning letter, give Ofcom a quality assurance report. Ofcom indicates 
that this report should specify the systems and procedures employed by the ISP, 
to match data contained in CIRs to subscriber accounts.115 The Ofcom Code 
explains that the ISP is required to publish that report as soon as reasonably 
possible, after it is issued to Ofcom.116 It concludes that upon receipt of a CIR 
from a rightholder, the ISP is under an obligation to identify and notify the 
subscriber to which the IP address detailed in the CIR related at the time of the 
alleged copyright contravention.117 Notably, as flagged above, this can be 
contrasted with Parker J’s ‘policeman analogy’ in British Telecommunications 
Plc & Anor, R (on the application of) v The Secretary of State for Business, 
Innovation and Skills. Parker J found that pursuant to Article 15(1) of E-
Commerce Directive 2000/31/EC, nothing in the DEA compelled ISPs to 
investigate and analyse the information transmitted to them by rightholders.118  
 
The Ofcom Code also states that a time-based three strikes notification process is 
adequate.119 Firstly, the initial notification is sent after the first-matched CIR in 
12 months; secondly, the intermediate notification is sent after the second-
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matched CIR in 12 months; thirdly, the infringement list notification is sent after 
the third-matched CIR in 12 months; and fourthly, the further infringement list 
notification is sent after a new-matched CIR in 12 months.120 It is worth pointing 
out that Ofcom considers that 1 month is a reasonable minimum time between 
one warning letter being sent and the next being issued by a CIR.121 Moreover, 
importantly, Ofcom stresses that the goal of the DEA is to tackle mass online 
copyright infringement by changing subscriber behaviour over time, and 
‘excluding persistent low-level infringers’, does not satisfy this condition.122 
However, in assessing the compatibility of Section 3 with the third-part of the 
Strasbourg Court’s non-cumulative test, under Article 8(2) of the Convention, 
one could argue that there should be some monitoring of the volume of CIRs, not 
only persistence of the infringement. It should be emphasized that in the Ofcom 
Draft Initial Obligations Code Consultation document, BIS suggested a volume-
based three strikes notification process, where the first notification was triggered 
by 10 CIRs; the second by 30 CIRs; and the third by 50 CIRs.123  
The necessity and proportionality of monitoring software measures like 
MarkMonitor, was expressly examined in R (British Telecommunications plc and 
TalkTalk Telecom Group plc) v Secretary of State for Culture, Olympics, Media 
and Sport and others. The Court of Appeal observed that the appellants relied 
upon the EDPS’s opinion on the legality of a ‘three strikes internet disconnection 
policy’.124 The Court noted that in paragraph 52 of this opinion, the EDPS 
recognized that the gathering of target-specific evidence, specifically in cases of 
a grave infringement, may be necessary to establish and exercise a legal claim. 
However, it explained that the EDPS questioned the lawfulness of large-scale 
investigations entailing the processing of vast amounts of user information. 
Interestingly, the Court highlighted that it was hard to see why following the 
EDPS’s opinion, the application of Article 8(2)(e) of the Data Protection 
Directive 95/46/EC, should depend upon the scale of the infringement. It 
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concluded that, in any case, the EDPS’s opinion was ‘not binding’.125 However, 
since the EDPS’s opinion is notably consistent with the ECtHR’s case-law the 
Court’s finding appears questionable. 
 
In the CJEU case of Scarlet Extended SA v Société belge des auteurs, 
compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL (SABAM), the AG observed that the Strasbourg 
Court had not yet had the chance to pronounce on the compatibility of measures 
designed to monitor electronic communications with the Convention. However, 
he remarked that considering its jurisprudence on telephone tapping, these 
measures were tantamount to interferences with the right to privacy, as 
guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention.126 The ECtHR’s case-law has 
confirmed that, under Article 8(2) ECHR, factors to be taken into account when 
assessing the necessity and proportionality of secret surveillance measures 
include: firstly, whether minimally invasive techniques have been tried and 
proven to be ineffective;127 secondly, whether these measures are limited in 
time;128 and thirdly, the gravity of the offence.129  
 
In terms of the first requirement, using the example of Uzun v Germany, the 
Strasbourg Court observed that under Article 8(2) of the Convention, in assessing 
the necessity of secret surveillance measures, less invasive techniques should 
have been tried and proven to be ineffective.130 Similarly, the RIPA Code states 
that no activity is proportionate if the evidence could reasonably be acquired in a 
less-invasive way.131 As outlined above, Ofcom remarks that the aim of the Act 
is to tackle mass online copyright infringement, and ‘excluding persistent low-
level infringers’, fails to satisfy such a condition.132 However, it is concerning that 
this differs significantly from the EDPS’ warning that regarding the necessity of 
an enforcement measure interfering with privacy rights, it is essential to establish 
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first whether subscriber monitoring could be carried out in a less invasive way.133 
Importantly, the EDPS opinion underlines that IP enforcement can also be 
attained through the monitoring of a specific number of users allegedly involved 
in ‘non-trivial’ online copyright infringement.134 He indicates that following the 
commercial scale rule contained in Article 8 of the Intellectual Property Rights 
Enforcement Directive 2004/48/EC, rightholders can perform targeted 
monitoring of specific subscriber IP addresses: firstly, to confirm the scale of the 
infringement; and, secondly, to keep track of CIRs for that purpose. However, he 
concludes that such data can only be used after having confirmed its scale. He 
illustrates this point by referring to cases of obvious online copyright abuse, 
which aim to achieve economic benefits.135 Thus, as Section 3 of the DEA does 
not require that less invasive targeted subscriber monitoring be tried, it is arguable 
that it fails to satisfy the ECtHR necessity principle under Article 8(2) ECHR.   
As far as the second requirement is concerned, in Kennedy v the United Kingdom, 
the ECtHR noted that, under Article 8(2) of the ECHR, in order to avoid abuse of 
power, domestic legislation had to lay down, by statute, a limit on the duration of 
secret surveillance measures.136 Likewise, the RIPA Code states that concerning 
the duration of authorisations, a written authorisation expires (unless renewed or 
cancelled) after three months.137 In the CJEU decision of Scarlet Extended SA v 
Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL (SABAM), the AG made 
explicit reference to the technical expert report, which assessed the technical 
feasibility of the anti-infringement solutions suggested by SABAM.138 The 
technical expert report stressed that, unlike website-blocking injunctions, the 
investigation techniques employed to enforce online copyright infringement on 
file-sharing systems (e.g., MarkMonitor’s DtecNet software), were more 
complex to carry out, but provided better outcomes. Notably, the report indicated 
that in the medium to long term, these anti-infringement methods were the best 
type of investment, in order to guarantee respect for copyright law.139 However, 
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to counter this, one could claim that the technical expert report regrettably appears 
to disregard the fact that in detecting infringing activity MarkMonitor’s DtecNet 
software, never stops snooping on alleged copyright infringers. Crucially, in 
paragraph 20 of EMI Records (Ireland) Ltd v Eircom Ltd, Charleton J revealed 
that ‘continually scanning and rescanning internet communications’, DtecNet 
software, identified the content being communicated in various directions from 
P2P, or similar swarms and followed the P2P communication down the line, until 
it ended up in a specific PC and recorded its IP address.140 Indeed, in November 
2012, Stroz Friedberg reviewed MarkMonitor evidence and confirmed that 
DtecNet has specific inherent and added system redundancies that ensure that it 
carries out ‘continuous and consistent scanning’.141 Therefore, since Section 3 of 
the DEA places no limit on the number of hours of subscriber monitoring, it is 
debatable whether it fails to comply with the ECtHR proportionality principle 
under Article 8(2) ECHR.   
 
With regard to the third requirement, in Weber and Saravia v Germany, the 
ECtHR found that, in order to assess whether secret surveillance measures were 
proportionate under Article 8(2) ECHR, the gravity of the offence had to be 
considered.142 Again, the RIPA Code indicates that an offence might be so trivial, 
that any use of covert techniques would be disproportionate.143 As stated above, 
unlike BIS volume-based approach, the Ofcom Code emphasizes that a time-
based, three strikes notification process is adequate.144 However, it is to be 
regretted that this notably fails to take into account the CJEU judgement of 
L'Oréal SA and others v eBay International AG and others. Here, the CJEU held 
that in assessing whether the offender surpassed the realms of a private activity 
and acted ‘in the course of trade’, the ‘volume’ and ‘frequency’ of infringing acts, 
were vital considerations.145 The EDPS recognizes that, pursuant to the 
commercial scale rule in Article 8 of Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement 
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Directive 2004/48/EC, subscriber monitoring might be proportionate, in the 
context of restricted, individual, ad hoc cases, where strong suspicions of online 
copyright infringement on a commercial scale exist.146 He explains that only this 
specific type of subscriber monitoring can be considered proportionate to prepare 
legal claims, including litigation.147 He clarifies that ‘commercial scale’ would 
not only exclude actions performed by subscribers acting in good faith, but also 
those performed for personal and not-for-profit purposes.148 However, 
importantly, he remarks that general or random monitoring, concerning not-for-
profit or minor, small-scale online copyright infringement would be 
disproportionate and violate Article 8 of the ECHR.149 This is a view shared by 
Kokott in her discussion of Productores de Musica de Espana (Promusicae) v 
Telefonica de Espana SAU.150 Thus, since under Section 3 of the DEA, 
monitoring software measures are not specifically targeted to serious online 
copyright infringement cases of ‘commercial scale’, an argument can be made 
that it fails to satisfy the ECtHR proportionality principle, under Article 8(2) 
ECHR.   
 
Covert surveillance of subscribers could constitute a violation of their right 
to privacy under Article 8 of the Convention  
This paper has examined the compatibility of the s3 DEA obligation to notify 
subscribers of CIRs with Article 8 of the ECHR. A growing body of research has 
investigated whether relying on human rights as a benchmark the DEA is a 
proportionate response to the problem of online copyright infringement.151 To 
date, however, there has been very little research conducted on the legality of the 
Act from the context of the UK’s duties, under the Convention, specifically 
Article 8. If this research has not been undertaken, the input of the cyberlawyer 
in this area would be missing.152 I conclude that unless the implementation of 
Section 3 of the DEA required the involvement of State authorities (e.g., the 
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courts or the ICO) and was specifically targeted to serious online copyright 
infringement cases of ‘commercial scale’, it could infringe part one and part three 
of the ECtHR’s test, thereby violating subscribers’ Article 8 ECHR rights. Thus, 
perhaps the time has come for the UK government to require the ICO to check 
and authorise the evidence gathering technical standard. The RIPA Code states 
that for monitoring to be proportionate, it is essential to balance the scope of the 
monitoring against the gravity of the offence.153 To make this effective, the ICO 
should follow the EDPS’s opinion ensuring that subscriber monitoring is limited 
in scope (specific, existing or future court proceedings); in time (at only certain 
times or days); and in the number of monitored users (only commercial scale 
copyright infringers).154 Additionally, the ICO should also observe Harbor Labs’ 
recommendation ensuring that MarkMonitor implements supplementary security 
measures such as, which personnel can access data, how long data is to be stored, 
how data is to be destroyed, and how data is to be properly protected from theft.155 
Indeed, this is particularly the case when the Strasbourg Court has stressed that 
for domestic legislation to be compatible with Article 8 of the Convention, it must 
have in place minimum safeguards concerning third party access, data retention 
duration, data destruction, and data confidentiality and integrity.156 On the 
contrary, the violation of subscriber privacy by the private sector (e.g., 
MarkMonitor) will be routine, disproportionate and illegal, and the UK law could 
face potential legal challenges at the EU or ECtHR level. In my view, this is 
indeed alarming because eventually, these subscriber monitoring practices could 
become a widely-accepted practice. However, no matter how sophisticated the 
surveillance methods adopted, opposition from subscribers will result in tactics 
to frustrate IP address gathering being employed and improved. For instance, the 
EDPS stresses that file-sharing systems can evolve, ensuring that information is 
exchanged privately in different ways, such as not employing Peer IDs or 
permitting double secured hops for each portion of bytes transmitted.157 However, 
even if the ICO were to check and authorise the evidence gathering technical 
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standard, and require MarkMonitor to adopt supplementary security measures, 
the question remains as to when subscribers might become commercial scale 
copyright infringers. Expert research shows that approximately 100 initial 
uploaders, (those individuals who first upload copyrighted content in file-sharing 
networks) publish 67 percent of the material. This represents 75 percent of all 
downloads.158 However, importantly, it reveals that while these initial uploads 
trigger billions of downloads, such initial uploaders use platforms, such as, the 
Pirate Bay to attract millions of BitTorrent users to their websites ‘for financial 
gain’ by displaying the embedded URL to them at different moments of the 
download.159 Thus, there seems little the UK government can do other than to 
start taking seriously Kokott’s recommendation in the case of Productores de 
Musica de Espana (Promusicae) v Telefonica de Espana SAU that the collection 
of subscriber uploader’s IP addresses should be limited to ‘particularly serious 
cases such as… offences committed with a view to making a profit, that is, an 
illegal use of protected works which substantially impairs their economic 
exploitation’.160 Indeed, even more so when Ofcom itself has proposed that 
‘alternatively’, rightholders could exclusively target initial uploaders by 
analysing newly introduced files to ascertain not only their identity, but also their 
location.161 What remains to be seen is, however, whether targeting initial 
uploaders can be done effectively. Expert research indicates that since initial 
uploaders can access the internet using anonymity tools, investigatory agents 
could mistakenly detect a middlebox, (i.e., proxies, Network Address Translators, 
IPv6 gateways, etc), as an initial uploader.162 Yet, as TorrentFreak has noted, 
NSA-like surveillance technology is currently being employed to monitor users 
using multiple proxies.163 The effect of this concerning subscribers’ rights is that 
as will always be the case, it is impossible to guarantee absolute privacy on the 
internet. Meanwhile, expert research shows that whilst the top 10 initial uploaders 
are hosting companies located in France and Germany, concluding that the users 
behind such initial uploaders live in these countries is erroneous, since their 
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servers are hired by individuals residing in other countries.164 In British 
Telecommunications Plc & Anor, R (on the application of) v The Secretary of 
State for Business, Innovation and Skills Parker J himself found that, taken 
together, both Article 8 of the Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement Directive 
2004/48/EC and the EDPS’s opinion, online copyright infringement might be 
tackled by targeting big, commercial scale copyright infringers.165 Thus, it may 
seem disproportionate to not particularly target at those who bear the greatest 
responsibility, (e.g., initial uploaders). However, in my opinion, nothing may be 
more disproportionate than the fact that in the reverse situation, Section 3 of the 
DEA violated subscribers’ Article 8 ECHR rights under the Convention.  
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